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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

PAUL RUBEY and
CAROL RUBEY, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

Case No.
9833
Case No.
10001

MORRIS T. WOOD and
RUBY J. WOOD, his wife,
Defendants and appellants.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
Appeal from Judgment of Third District Court in
and for Salt Lake County, Utah.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action in equity for specific performance of a written contract for the sale of land.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 18, 1959, appellants and repondents,
at appellants' home near Herriman, Salt Lake Coun-
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ty, Utah, jointly prepared and executed a typewritten contract (Exhibit P-1) for the sale to respondents of 728 acres, more or less, of farm land for a
price of $107,000.00 with an option to purchase an
additional 55 acres for $8,350.00. More than three
weeks thereafter, on May 11, 1959, after several
telephone conversations between the parties, the
Rubeys and the Woods met again at the Wood home
where they jointly prepared and executed a handwritten supplement to the typewritten document
(Exhibit P-2). The terms of this supplement reduced the amount of the initial payment, increased
the amount of the annual installment payments, repeated various provisions of the typewritten contract
and added certain provisions requested by appellants.
Subsequently, but before the initial payment
was due, Rubey tendered $5,000.00 to Wood. Wood
rejected the tender and repudiated the contract. This
action was then commenced for specific performance. Appellants interposed a counterclaim seeking
to quiet ti tie to the property, and for judgment declaring the contracts to be void.
The action was tried on November 30 and December 1, 1960, before the Honorable Aldan J. Anderson, sitting as a Court in Equity with an advisory
jury. After plaintiffs put the two contracts into evidence, defendants went forth first with their proof.
At the conclusion of defendants' case, plaintiffs
moved for and were granted a judgment for specific
performance in the form of a Judgment on Directed
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Verdict (R-9833, p.10). The Court stated that plaintiffs' contentions regarding the contracts were accepted and defendants' counterclaims were dismissed. From the judgment on directed verdict
appellants appealed to the above entitled Court (Case
No. 9447) in which appeal the above Court unanimously affirmed the lower court (R-9833, p. 14).
Respondents then tendered to appellants $15,000.00 which tender was rejected in a letter signed
by appellants stated as follows:
"September 26, 1962
"Dear Mr. and Mrs. Rubey:
"We received a letter dated September 20,
1962, from Jensen, Jensen & Bradford.
"We particularly deny that there was ever
a valid contract between us and further deny
that any valid tender was ever made or a performance made in any manner or form provided by law, or as promised as an inducement
for said contracts, or as provided in said contract or at all.
"In particular, we deny that you ever
made any payment or tender of payment called
for on or before May 11, 1962, as you assert,
and your present purported tender at this
time is not timely and is refused. You are further advised that your failure to pay payments has voided any claim or contract and
you are further advised that any rights that
you might claim under the purported contracts have been terminated and are of no
effect.
,
''Very truly yours
jsj Morris T. Wood
"jsj Ruby Wood"
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Subsequent to the entry of the Decree of the
lower court, from which the original Appeal in the
above en ti tied cause was taken (Case No. 944 7) , and
notwithstanding the fact that said Decree found the
Agreement between the parties to be valid and binding, defendants placed on record in the office of the
County Recorder of Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
mortgages totaling $92,550.00.
On the 4th day of October, 1962, respondents
moved for an Order to Show Cause ( R-9833, p. 26).
Appellants appeared and were found in contempt
of court (R-10001, p. 106), but sentencing was
stayed pending final outcome on appeal (R-10001,
p. 114-5).
Upon stipulation of all of the parties (R-10001,
p. 114) a referee was appointed to interpret the
contracts. By order of the court, (R-10001, p. 155),
the report of the referee (R-10001, p. 121-6) was
accepted by the court, the findings of the referee
were adopted by the court, and the court made and
entered Findings based upon the referee's report,
together with addi tonal Findings of the court based
upon its own study of the two contracts. An Amended
Decree to this effect was entered July 29, 1963. No
mention is made of this Amendment to Decree in
either of appellants' Notices of Appeal (R-9833, p.
55; R-10001, p. 167).
On the 4th day of October, 1962, respondents
commenced Civil Action No. 139046 in the Third
Judicial District C~urt in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, seeking damages for unlawful refusal

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
on the part of appellants to obey the Decree of the
court and to deliver possession of portions of the
property to respondents as said portions were paid
in full by respondents, and seeking to remove the
mortgages placed on said property by appellants
after the entry of the original Decree December 1,
1960.
On or about the 15th of October, 1962, appellants commenced Civil Action No. 139263 in the lower court seeking a declaratory judgment that the
contracts between the parties were void by reason
of alleged breach on the part of respondents. On
October 23, 1962, appellants' Motion to consolidate
No. 139263 with No. 124832 was granted, whereupon respondents' Motion to Dismiss No. 139263
was also granted ( R-9833, p. 43-44). No appeal was
taken from said Decree.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE COURT PROPERLY INTERPRETED
THE TWO WRITTEN CONTRACTS ACCORDING TO THEIR TERMS.
POINT II
APPELLANTS' SECOND POINT IS WITHOUT MERIT FOR THE REASON THAT NO MOTION TO DISMISS WAS MADE BY APPELLANTS BELOW, AND FOR THE FURTHER
REASON THAT RESPONDENTS MADE TIME-
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LY ANNUAL INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS UNDER THE CONTRACTS.
POINT III
THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONTRACTS WAS A MATTER OF LAW TO BE
DETERMINED BY THE COURT FROM THE
FACE OF THE INSTRUMENTS AND NO FURTHER TESTIMONY WAS REQUIRED BY THE
COURT.
.
POINT IV
THE .LOWER COURT PROPERLY INTERp R E T E D THE WORDS "OR MORE" CONTAINED IN THE CONTRACTS.
POINT V
APPELLANTS HAD NO RIGHT TO A JURY
TRIAL BELOW FOR THE REASON THAT THE
INSTANT CASE IS ONE IN EQUITY AND THE
MATTERS DETERMINED BY THE LOWER
C 0 U R T FROM WHICH THESE APPEALS
WERE TAKEN WERE MATTERS OF LAW.
POINT VI
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT APPELLANTS WE~E' NOT ENTITLED TO INTEREST UNDER THE CONTRACTS.
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POINT VII
THE COURT PROPERLY CONSOLIDATED
CIVIL ACTION NO. 139263 WITH NO. 124832
AND PROPERLY DISMISSED NO. 139263.
POINT VIII
THE LOWER COURT P R 0 P E R L Y DIRECTED THE CLERK OF THE COURT TO
MAKE AND DELIVER A WARRANTY DEED
TO THE RESPONDENTS SUBSEQUENT TO
APPELLANTS' REFUSAL TO OBEY THE ORDER OF THE COURT TO EXECUTE SUCH
DEED.
POINT IX
IT WAS PROPER FOR THE LOWER COURT
TO ORDER THE CLERK OF THE COURT TO
SATISFY A JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS F 0 R ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND COSTS OF SUIT OUT OF THE DEPOSIT THAT HAD BEEN MADE TO THE
CLERK OF THE COURT BY RESPONDENTS.
POINT X
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY AWARDED JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES IN
FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS BASED UPON THE
TESTIMONY OF COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTS.
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POINT XI
THE APPELLATE COURT SHOULD NOT
GIVE CONSIDERATION TO APPELLANTS'
BRIEF FOR THE REASON THAT IT STATES
ONLY POINTS OF LAW AND MAKES NO REFERENCE TO ANY FACTS IN THE RECORD
TO WHICH SUCH POINTS OF LAW MAY BE
RELEVANT.
POINT XII
APPEAL NO. 10001 SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THE ORDER ENTERED
SEPTEMBER 26, 1963 FROM WHICH THE APPEAL IS TAKEN IS NOT A FINAL JUDGMENT.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT PROPERLY INTERPRETED
THE TWO WRITTEN CONTRACTS ACCORDING TO THEIR TERMS.
Appellants have referred this Court to the
briefs submitted in the first appeal in the above entitled matter, and consequently respondents are
forced to make reference to said briefs, as background, although such reference to the closed chapters of the long and painful history of this case is
merely offered by appellants to assist them in their
newest of many repeated attempts to obtain a review and re-adjudication of matters long since
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settled. This Court, however, should not consider
appellants' repetitious challenges to the decisions
of this Court and the court below in the case at bar,
which decisions do not coincide with appellants'
views, as being either reason or argument. "While
it may be a relief to their feelings, it does not carry
conviction to the judicial mind." Hilton v. Thatcher,
31 U. 360, at p. 377, 88 P. 20 (1907).
The issues before this Court on the first appeal
of the case had generally to do with whether the two
contracts involved were valid and binding or whether, as contended by appellants, they should have been
rescinded for fraud. Those issues were resolved in
favor of respondents when this Honorable Court
unanimously affirmed the lower court ( R-9833, p.
14).
The general issue before the lower court since
the conclusion of the first appeal, and the issue now
before this Court is: How are the contracts to be
performed?
Appellants' Point 1 rests on the assumption that
the two documents involved herein were prepared
solely by respondents. This assumption is false. The
typewritten document prepared April 18, 1959, was
fully discussed point by point in the presence of all
parties thereto, and was then dictated aloud in the
presence of all parties by Paul Rubey to his wife,
who operated the typewriter. The handwritten document dated May 11, 1959, was dictated by appellant
Morris Wood to respondent Paul Rubey in the presence of all parties to said document. These facts are
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born out by the following references to the transcript
of trial: P. 46, lines 3-6; P. 42, lines 9-12; P. 79,
lines 7-14; P. 80, line 30; P. 81, lines 9-11; P. 81,
lines 17-25; P. 88, lines 17-22; P. 100, lines 7-10; P.
115, lines 15-22.
Appellants refer on page 7 of their brief to 12
Am. Jur. 795, Sec. 252, concerning the manner in
which doubtful language in contracts should be interpreted most strongly against the party who uses
it. However, no language is cited in appellants' brief
from either contract which appellants claim to be
doubtful. This portion of appellants' brief should
therefore not be considered by the Court. See respondents' Point XI below. The rule quoted by appellants is further explained in Sec. 252 of 12 Am.
Jur. Contracts, pp. 795-796 as follows:
"The rule that expressions will be interpreted against the person using them applies
only where, after the ordinary rules of interpretation have been applied, the agreement
is still ambiguous."
In 17A CJS, p. 28 is stated:
"So a contract is ambiguous when, and
only when, it is, or the provisions in controversy are, reasonably or fairly susceptible
of different constructions or interpretations. . . ." ( p. 34)
Neither the trial court below, nor the referee
appointed pursuant to stipulation, found the language in either contract to be susceptible to differ-
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ent constructions or meanings. Consequently, rules
of construction do not apply.
Furthermore, when a contract is prepared by
both parties, using the language of both, one being
merely a scrivener, there is no reason to construe
the contract against anyone. Although Mrs. Rubey
typed the first contract and Mr. Rubey wrote the
second, both documents were, in fact, the product of
the minds of all of the parties thereto. Appellants
complain that the lower court ruled in favor of respondents in every instance. This fact is not disputed, but it is respectfully asserted that the contracts were thus interpreted because respondents'
contentions were the only logical interpretation possible.

Stout V13. Washington Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 14 U. 2d 414, 385 P. 2d 608 (1963), quoted
in appellants' brief, is not in point for the reason
that it involved an insurance policy which in fact
contained doubts and uncertainties as to its meaning and effect and was therefore properly construed
most strongly against the insurance company which
prepared it. To the contrary, in the case at bar, the
typewritten contract between Rubey and Wood was
prepared by both of them, and the handwritten contract was written by Rubey upon the dictation of
Wood. The facts in the instant case are therefore
distinguishable from the facts in the Stout case.
This Court, in its original opinion rendered in
the above entitled cause stated:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
"The parties were strangers to each
other. There had been no previous contacts
and no reason to establish a trusting relationship." (R-9833, p. 14.)
The parties to the two documents now in question
stood on equal footing, were free to do what they
chose, and because there is no Utah statute to the
contrary, the only duty of the lower court was to
discover the meaning of the specific documents and
to enforce them without leaning in either direction.
12 Am. Jur. Contracts, Sec. 226 et seq p. 745.
At page 8 of their brief, appellants again allege
that Rubey had extraordinary background and experience and infer that the Woods were naive and
inexperienced. On this point, reference is again made
to the Court's previous opinion in the above entitled
matter (R-9833, p. 14) where the Court quoted Justice Crockett in Lewis v. White 2 U. 2d 101, 269 P.
2d 865 ( 1954) as follows:
"No matter how naive or inexperienced
the defendants were, they could not close their
eyes and accept unquestioningly any representations made to them. It was their duty to
make such investigation and inquiry as reasonable care under the circumstances would
dictate."
Any naivete or inexperience under which appellants may have labored at the conception of the two
documents before the court is no defense to an action for specific performance, nor should it now be
pertinent upon the question of interpretation of the
contracts.
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There being no reason to construe either of the
contracts against any party thereto, the court below
properly interpreted the contracts according to their
terms.
POINT II
APPELLANTS' SECOND POINT IS WITHOUT MERIT FOR THE REASON THAT NO MOTION TO DISMISS WAS MADE BY APPELLANTS BELOW, AND FOR THE FURTHER
REASON THAT RESPONDENTS MADE TIMELY ANNUAL INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS UNDER THE CONTRACTS.
Appellants' Notice of Appeal in Case No. 9833
( R-9833, p. 55) makes no reference to a Motion to
Dismiss, nor does their Notice of Appeal in Case No.
10001 (R-10001, p. 167). There is in fact no such
motion in the record. There is therefore nothing for
the Court to consider under Point 2 of appellants'
Brief.
Appellants have repeatedly sought to obtain a
redetermination of the merits of this case with their
successive motions, objections etc. in the lower
court, their action commenced for Declaratory J udgment, their motion in the above court to rehear the
original appeal and their Motion to Recall Remittitur and Reconsider their Motion for Rehearing in
the above Court on the initial appeal. Again, in Point
2 of their brief, appellants attempt to avoid the consequences of the original judgment for specific performance, as unanimously affirmed by this Court,
by making reference to a nonexistent motion to dis-
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miss based on an alleged failure to tender contract
payments as required by the contracts within the
time specified, or within the 90-day grace period
therein set forth.
In any event, respondents have repeatedly made
timely tender of the annual contract installment payments called for in the agreement.
The record reflects that early in 1960, before
the first payment was due on the contract, respondents tendered to appellants $5,000.00 representing
the initial payment on the contract ( Tr. p. 49). This
payment was refused, the contract was repudiated
and this action resulted. Thereafter, on the 7th day
of December, 1960, respondents tendered to appellants $10,730.00 representing the initial payment together with the annual installment payment for the
year 1961 (R-10001, p. 59), which installment was
then not yet due. This tender was likewise refused.
Thereafter, on the 20th day of September, 1962, befor the third annual installment payment was due,
respondents tendered to appellants $15,000.00 (R10001, p. 97) representing the payments for 1960,
1961 and 1962. Again this tender was rejected.
(See appellants' letter set forth in the statement
of facts above.)
In the Conclusions of Law entered by the lower
Court on the 27th day of November 1962, (R-9833 p.
38) the court stated that the tender of $15,000.00
by letter and the payment into court in Civil Action
No. 139046 was a valid and timely tender of the
$15,000.00. The sum of $15,000.00 was thereafter
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paid into Court by respondents in Civil Action No.
139046 and said sum minus certain costs paid therefrom pursuant to Court Order ( R-9833, p. 43-5),
remains on deposit with the court.
The transcript of trial discloses the following:
P. 25, lines 2-5
"Q. You were aware, were you not, that
this last spring, in 1960, Mr. Rubey through
his attorney, Mr. Jensen, offered to pay it to
me as your attorney, a $5,000.00 payment?
"A. Yes."
P. 50, lines 20-25
"Q. I would like to clear up the time
when this $5,000.00 was offered. I was just
about to look to see when this action was filed.
Depositions were taken on April16, 1960 and
the action was filed before that. Wasn't it
true that the $5,000.00 offer was made before
this suit was commenced?
"A. Yes."
It thus appears clearly from the facts that each
year respondents have made timely tender of full,
cumulative payment to appellants. Appellants' statement in Point 2 on page 8 of their brief, is therefore
not true. Even if such tender had not been made, respondents would have been excused therefrom under
the general rule that tender to a party who has
breached a contract or repudiated it is a futile act
and is not required.
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In 17A CJS, p. 680, is stated:
"Non tender of performance is excused
where it is apparent that a tender would be
a vain and idle ceremony, or where the other
party has prevented performance."
From the inception of the above cause, appellants have steadfastly repudiated the contracts,
which repudiation must certainly deprive appellants
of any right to claim a breach on the part of respondents, even had the same occurred.
The rule stated above excused respondents from
tendering the annual installment payments, but respondents have nevertheless gone the extra mile and
made repeated tenders notwithstanding appellants'
repudiation of the contracts.
Appellants in their brief cite Shernwn w. Western Construct-ion Company, Inc., 14 Wash. 2d 252,
127 P.2d, 673 ( 1942), 17 CJS 932, but the language
quoted by appellants appears in the dissent, not in
the main opinion. Thus, that case does not stand
for the proposition claimed by appellants, and is not
in point.
Appellants further quote from the last phrase
of 55 Am. Jur. p. 1014 under Vendor and Purchase,
Section 621, where it states:
" ... and if payment is to be made in installments, default in the payment of any installment is 3: distinct breach and gives tlie
vendor the right to declare the forfeiture
therefor."
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However, appellants omitted the first part of
this paragraph which states:
"The equitable estate or interest of the
purchaser under an executory contract for the
sale of land may be subject to be defeated
under provisions therefor in the contract if
he fails to comply with the stipulations in the
contract." 55 Am. Jur., p. 1014, Sec. 621 (Italics ours).
Obviously, the passage quoted by appellants is
a misleading extraction from the context of the paragraph and is improper in appellants' brief. Forfeiture for nonpayment is only a remedy if such remedy
is explicitely spelled out in the contract. The RubeyWood contract contains no such remedy of forfeiture for non-payment. True, the handwritten document (Exhibit P-2) provides for liquidated damages in the event of default, but the typewritten
document (Exhibit P-1) expressly binds the buyers
to buy the entire 728 acres, and there is no express
remedy for forfeiture in case of non-payment. Furthermore, there is no fact of non-payment in the instant case as set forth above.
Appellants have continuously, throughout the
long history of the above case, appeared to assume
that the breach of contract, assuming the same were
to occur, would, in and of itself, automatically void
the contract. Contracts, however, do not terminate
automatically. A default under a contract may be
waived. Cancellation requires affirmative action by
the party desiring to terminate a contract and there
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is no such action on the part of the Woods in the
above cause except an abortive attempt to obtain
a Declaratory Judgment, which action was properly
dismissed (R-9833, p. 43-4).
Even if a Motion to Dismiss had been filed by
appellants based on an alleged non-tender under the
contract, such motion would have been properly
denied.
POINT III
THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONTRACTS WAS A MATTER OF LAW TO BE DETERMINED BY THE COURT FROM THE FACE
OF THE INSTRUMENTS AND NO FURTHER
TESTIMONY WAS REQUIRED BY THE COURT.
A. The intention of parties to a contract must
be determined by the Court from an examination
of the contract only. 12 Am. Jur. Contracts, Sec. 229.
Throughout the long history of the proceedings
in the above entitled cause, defendant-appellants
have continually urged the court to take evidence
to determine the intention of the parties at the times
the two documents were executed in an effort to get
the court to interpret the contracts in accordance
with appellants' contentions. The general rule concerning interpretation of contracts is set forth in 12
Am. Jur. Contracts, 227, p. 746 as follows:
"Whatever may be the inaccuracy of expression or of the ineptness of the words used
in an instrument in a legal view, if the intention of the parties can be clearly discovered,
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the Court will give effect to it and construe
the words accordingly. It must not be supposed, however, that an attempt is made to
ascertain the actual mental processes of the
. parties to a particular contract. The law presumes that the parties understood the import
of their contract and that they have the intention which its terms manifest. It is not within
the function of the judiciary to look outside
of the instrument to get at the intention of
the parties and then carry out that intention
regardless of whether the instrument contains
language sufficient to express it; but their
sole duty is to find out what was meant by
the language of the instrument.... Taking
into consideration this limitation, it may be
said that the object of all rules of interpretation is to arrive at the intention of the parties
as it is expressed in the contract. In other
words, the object to be attained in interpreting a contract is to ascertain the meaning and
intent of the parties as expressed in the language used.''
·
Under this general rule, it would have been improper for the lower court in this matter to have inquired into the subjective intent of the parties to the
contracts as it may have existed prior to and at the
time of the execution of the two contracts in this
case. The court was limited to a consideration of
the intention of the parties as it appeared from the
language used by the parties in the two documents
themselves.
There is a myriad of cases standing for the
proposition that the intention of an instrument may
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be determined only from an examination of the terms
of the instrument itself. See Cook vs. Smith, 107 Tex.
119, 174 S.W. 1094,3 A.L.R. 940 (1915); Coal River
Collieries vs. Eureka Coal and Wood Co., 144 Va.
263, 132 S.E. 337, 46 A.L.R. 485 (1926); Kleuter
vs. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 143 Wis. 347, 128'
N.W. 43 (1910); Conery vs. New Orleans Water
WorloJ Co., 142, U.S. 79, 35 L. Ed. 943, 12 S. ct. 142
(1891); Griffin vs. Fairmont Coal Co., 59 W. Va.
480, 53 S.E. 24 ( 1905) ; Schneider vs. Turner, 130
Ill., 28, 22 N.E. 497 (1889); Delaware Ins. Co. vs.
Greer, 120 F. 916 (1903).
These rules may be summarized as follows:
It is commonly said that where a contract is
plain and unambiguous, its meaning should be determined without reference to extraneous facts; similarly it is said that where there is no ambiguity in
the language used in the contract, the intention of
the parties must be gathered from that and from
that alone. 12 Am. Jur. Contracts, Sec. 229, p. 752;
Green vs. Biddle, 8 Wheat. (U.S.) 1, 5 L. Ed. 547;
Kihlberg vs. U.S. 97 U.S. 398, 24 L. Ed 1106 (1878).
The lower Court referred the two contracts to
a referee pursuant to a stipulation of all of the
parties (R-10001, p. 114). The referee found the
document to be understandable and enforceable according to its own terms and made specific findings
with respect to the following:
1. The two contracts are one final agreement.
2. The contracts are performable.
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3. The real estate described therein is sufficiently identified.
4. The purchase price is clear.
5. The initial payment of $5,000.00 was to be"
made one year from May 11, 1959 with a 90-day
grace period.
6. The time for payment of the subsequent annual installments was within the calendar year plus
the 90-day grace period.
7. The contract provides for no interest but
provides that sellers retain crops in lieu of interest.
No interest could be charged beyond that.
8. The release clause is clear.
9. Sellers have the duty of furnishing surveys.
10. Sellers are obligated to deliver a separate
warranty deed on each parcel as conveyed.
11. The written notice requirement is clear.
12. Taxes are to be paid by sellers on unreleased parcels.
13. There is an option to purchase 55 additional acres.
The referee suggested that the Court make additional findings as to the following matters:
1. Title insurance.
2. Surveys.
3. The phrase "the release clause would not
release the buyers from the said amount of 728
acres."
4. Reduction of the purchase price in the event
certain parcels were not in fact owned by the sellers.
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Even though the contracts involved in this case
leave something to be desired as far as the artfullness of the language in them is concerned, still the
language was clear and unambiguous as found by
the referee and the court. There was, therefore, no
reason for the court to admit extrinsic evidence to
assist the court or the referee in interpreting the
terms of the contracts.
There is still another reason why the lower court
could not admit extrinsic evidence d'hors the contracts.as urged by appellants. In 12 Am. Jur. Contracts, 232 at p. 755 is stated:
"Where the parties intend a writing to
be the sole memorial or integration of the contract, the writing embodies the contract and,
accordingly, the interpretation of the contract
consists of interpretation of the writing. A
solemn instrument embodying the final intentions and agreements of the parties must be
interpreted according to the· legal import of
its terms. In the absence of mistake or fraud,
a written contract merges all prior and contemporaneous negotiations in reference to the
same subject, and the whole engagement of
the parties and the extent and manner of their
undertaking are embraced in the writing. The
written agreement and not the correspondence
which preceded it is the correct exponent of
the contract. All verbal agreements made at
or before the time of the execution of a contract, are to be considered as merged in the
written intsrument."
If, in each .case of dispute over a contract, the
Court were to inquire in to the relations of the
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parties, their knowledge, their discussions and verbal negotiations, there would be no point in preparing a written contract. The writing is the final word.
The contracts in the instant case must therefore be considered to be the final integration and
the sole memorial of the agreement between the
Rubeys and the Woods. Absence of mistake or fraud
was specifically found by the court on the trial below as affirmed by the Supreme Court on the first
appeal. Consequently, the written documents merged
in all prior and contemporaneous negotiations with
respect to the sale of the real estate involved in the
contracts, and therefore these written contracts, and
not the correspondence or discussions which preceeded them are the correct exponents of the contracts between the Rubeys and the Woods. The court
therefore could not properly have looked outside the
two documents to extrinsic evidence for the purpose
of determining the intention of the parties as urged
by appellants.
That a court may refer matters to a referee
is clearly set forth in Rule 53(a) and (b) Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. By stipulation of the parties hereto ( R-1 0001, p. 114) , the lower court in
the instant case referred the contracts by consent to
a referee, and based upon the report of the referee,
the court applied its judicial function in interpreting the con tracts and applying the law thereto.
As far as the findings of the referee are. concerned on appeal Hannaman m Karrick, 9 U. 236,
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33 P. 1039 (1893); Hannaman vs. Karrick, 168 U.S.
328, 42 L. Ed. 484, 18 S.Ct. 135 ( 1897) states that
the findings of the referee which have been adopted
by the Court will not be disturbed unless it is clearly
manifest that there was error or oversight. Appellants have shown no oversight or error in the referee's findings, and this Court, therefore, should not
disturb them.
On page 10 of their brief, appellants refer to
55 Am. Jur. Vendor and Purchaser, Sections 97 and
98, p. 573 as though the lower court had a duty to
interpret the contracts. However, the first footnote
under Section 97 refers to 12 Am. Jur. Contracts,
Sec. 227, p. 746 referred to above (p. 18). Thus
the applicability of the rules of construction referred
to under the title Vendor and Purchaser in 55 Am.
Jur. Sec. 97-98 depends initially on whether the contract in question need interpreting or whether the
contract is sufficiently clear as to speak for itself.
As pointed out above, these rules of construction do
not apply here.
In Newcomb vs. Wood, 97 U.S. 581, 24 L. Ed.
1085 (1878) is stated that parties who have stipulated that a controversy be submitted to a referee
clearly imply that they intend the award or report
to be final and conclusive. Thus, when the parties
in the instant case stipulated that the contracts be
submitted to a referee, they impliedly expressed their
intent that the referee's report would be binaing and
conclusive, and appellants should not be permitted
to complain of said findings.
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B. Following the remittitur from the Supreme
Court on the first appeal, no questions of fact were
before the court, the sole issue being the interpretation ,of the written documents already held to be
valid, binding and subsisting contracts in the original trial and on the first appeal.
Appellants cite no "disputed questions of fact"
in their brief under their point 3 (b) and that point
should therefore be disregarded by the Court.
C. The referee in paragraph 7 of his report,
(R-10001, p. 121) specifically found that each annual installment was to be paid within each calendar year plus a 90-day grace period. This finding
was expressly incorporated into the findings of the
court (R-10001, p. 155-60).
The determination of the time when each annual installment was to be paid was a matter of law,
which was determined by the referee and the court,
and, as such, is not the proper basis for appeal.
D. The referee made no specific findings concerning title insurance and surveys, but the court,
upon an examination of the documents, made findings concerning these matters (R-10001, p. 155-60).
The fact that the court was able, from the documents themselves, to make specific findings concerning the matters left unresolved by the referee, is in
and of itself sufficient proof that the documents
were, on their face, clear, unambiguous and susceptible of proper interpretation by the court as a mat-
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ter of law and without resorting to extrinsic evidence.
POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY INTERPRETED THE WORDS "OR MORE" CONTAINED IN THE CONTRACTS.
In the lower court, appellants contended that
the words "or more" appearing in the contracts in
question, meant that the contract sellers, i.e., appellants, were to have the right to make demand upon
the buyers (respondents) to make payments in excess of the amounts called for in the contracts. The
referee determined that the words "or more" under
general usage in the real estate industry, and according to the law of contracts in general, gave the buyers, not the sellers, the option to accelerate contract
payments. The usual interpretation of those words
is clear, and the court cannot be said to have committed an error by failing to admit parole evidence
to vary their obvious and universal meaning.
The general rule is stated in 12 Arn. Jur., Contracts, Sec. 236, p. 758 as follows:
"Words will be given their ordinary
meaning when nothing appears to show that
they are used in a different sense, and no
unreasonable or absurd consequences will result from doing so. Words chosen by the contracting parties should not be unnaturally
forced beyond their ordinary meaning or given a curious, hidden sense which nothing but
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the exigency of a hard case and the ingenuity
of a trained and acute mind can discover."
The words "or more" have an ordinary meaning as found by the referee and the lower court.
There is no reason appearing in the contracts or the
record to force these words unnaturally beyond their
ordinary meaning. Nothing appears in the contract
as supplemented to suggest that any other meaning
was intended than the usual and ordinary meaning
of the words. It is ridiculous to construe "or more"
to give the seller the right to demand more than is
due. Such construction would make the instrument
a demand instrument, whereas the contracts in question, in fact, provide for annual installment payments over a period up to 23 years.
For these reasons, and because no proffer of
evidence to the contrary was made by appellants below, there was no reason for the lower court to
admit such evidence and failure to do so cannot be
said to have been error.
POINT V
APPELLANTS HAD NO RIGHT TO A JURY
TRIAL BELOW FOR THE REASON THAT THE
INSTANT CASE IS ONE IN EQUITY AND THE
MATTERS DETERMINED BY THE LOWER
COURT FROM WHICH THESE APPEALS
WERE TAKEN WERE MATTERS OF LAW.
The answer to Point 5 contained in appellants'
brief appears in appellants' own discussion, where it
is stated that:
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"The Constitution of the United States,
the Utah State Constitution and our Rules
of Civil Procedure all direct that a jury trial
shall be had upon demand of any party, unlesl3
it is an equity proceeding or some other situation where a jury trial is not appropriate."
(Italics our) (Appellants' Brief p. 13.)
The above Court in its original opinion in the
case at bar stated that this case is one in equity. The
general rule is that equitable actions, as such, are
not within the constitutional provisions that .the
right to trial by jury shall remain inviolate so that
the right as "heretofore enjoyed" shall be preserved.
Ketchum Coal Co. vs. District Court of Carbon County, 48 U. 342, 159, p. 737 ( 1916) ; U. S. vs. Loufuiana, 339 U.S. 699 94 L. Ed 1216, 70 S.Ct. 914
(1950); Pacific Railway Company vs. Wade, 91 Cal.
449, 27 P 768 (1891); Woolsey vs. Woolsey, 121
Cal. App. 576, 9 P. 2d 605 ( 1932) ; U. S. Fidelity &
Guarantee Company vs. Springbrook Farm Dairy,
Inc., 135 Conn. 294, 64 A 2d. 39, 13 A.L.R. 2d 769
(1949).
Thus, the constitutional guarantees to a jury
trial as are claimed by appellants were not available
to them in this equity case.
This action is one for specific performance of
written documents, the meaning and operation of
which have been in issue since the Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court to the effect that the documents were one binding agreement.
The legal effect of written instruments is a
question of law to be determined by the Court, even
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where the facts affecting the terms of the written
instrument are in dispute as where the instruments
have been lost, in which case the jury may find what
the terms of the contract were. Verdi vs. Helper
State Bank, 57 U. 502, p. 510, 196 P. 225 (1921).
In Title 78-21-3 Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
it is stated that the Court is to decide questions of
law, including the construction of statutes and other
writings. It was thus for the Court below, not a jury,
to interpret the contracts in evidence.
Appellants cite Holland vs. Wilson, 8 U. 2d 11,
327 P. 2d 250 (1958) which case is not in point.
That action was one to quiet title, an action at law,
not one in equity for the construction or interpretation of written documents as is the instant case.
True, appellants herein originally interposed a counterclaim to quiet title, but that did not convert the
action to one at law. In Butler Bros. Development
Company vs. Butler, 111 Vt. 329, 108 P. 2d 1041
( 1941), it was held that imposing a legal defense
to an equitable action does not as a general rule
entitle a party to a jury trial. (Accord: Holland vs.
Wifuon, supra; Newbern vs. Farris, 149 Okl. 74, 299,
P. 192 (1931).) Appellants, by their counterclaim
to quiet title, did not become entitled to a jury trial.
Furthermore, the lower court, prior to the first appeal, expressly dismissed all of the appellants' counterclaims ( R-9833, p. 12) so that subsequently there
was no issue to quiet title before the court.
Even if appellants below had been entitled to
a jury trial they waived such right by failing to de-
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mand a jury trial. The general rule is that a failure
to demand a jury trial or properly to give notice that
one is desired within the time provided by statute
constitutes or gives rise to a presumption that that
right has been waived. Rule 38 U.R.C.P; Duignan
VIS. u. s., 27 4 u. s. 195, 71 L. Ed. 996, 4 7 s. Ct. 566
(1927); Gulbenkian vs. Gulbenkian, 147 F. 2d 173
(1945).
Several documents appear in the record in which
appellants generally allude to their claim that the
court should take additonal testimony and evidence to bring out the intentions of the parties, but
nowhere does there appear a demand for a jury subsequent to the first appeal. See Morris Wood's affidavit (R-10001, p. 88); appellants' Motion to stay
enforcement of judgment (R-10001, p. 86); affidavit of counsel for appellants (R-10001, p. 107);
stipulation (R-10001, p. 107); stipulation (R-10001,
p. 114); Objections to Amendment to Decree (R10001, p. 153) ; Objections to Amendment of Decree
(R-10001, p. 161); affidavit (R-9833, p. 34). Appellants' failure to demand a jury below, or give
notice that one was desired was a waiver of any
right they may have claimed to a jury trial and not
having raised the question of a right to a trial by
jury below, appellants may not raise such an issue
for the first time on appeal.
A jury trial may be demanded only when issues
of fact arise from the pleadings, 59 C.J.S. p. 739,
fts. 99, 2 and 3. No such issues of fact have been
before the lower court since the conclusion of the
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first appeal herein, and consequently, appellants
have had no right to a jury.
POINT VI
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT APPELLANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO INTEREST UNDER THE CONTRACTS.
The contracts before the Court provide that
the sellers, appellants herein, were to retain all crops
on property not fully paid for and released to the
buyers, respondents. The referee specifically found
that such provision was in lieu of interest that no
interest could be charged beyond that (R-10001, p.
123, para. 8). This finding of the referee was specifically incorporated in the findings of the court. ( R10001, p. 157, para. g).
This interpretation is substantiated in the original opinion of the above-entitled Court (R-9833,
p. 14) where it is stated:
"Defendants testified that they did not
read the contract but understood from the oral
representation of plaintiff that: ... (2) they
were to have full use of all the land until fully
paid for in lieu of the payment of interest ... "
Interest is payable on a contract only when a
contract so provides. It is untenable to suppose that
respondents should be required to allow appellants
to retain possession of the land and the crops, and
in addition, be required to pay interest on the unpaid contract balance.
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The authority cited under Point 6 of appellants'
brief, Wasatch Mining Company vs. Cresent Mining
Co., 7 U. 8, 24 P. 586 (1890) sets forth the general
rule in Utah that interest may be allowed on debts
overdue, even in the absence of a statute or a contract providing therefor. Respondents do not quarrel with this citation of the Utah Law, but point
out to the Court that the Wasatch case is inapplicable
to the case at bar for the reason that there is no
overdue debt involved upon which the court could
have allowed interest to accrue. Obviously, the unpaid contract balance is not due except as and when
the annual $5,000.00 installment payments fall due
on December 31 of each calendar year (R-10001, p.
156, para. f). As stated in Point II above, however,
respondents have repeatedly made timely tender to
appellants so that at no time has there been any
amount of the purchase price provided in said contract which could be said to be past due, and as to
which interest could accrue.
The following extracts from the transcript of
trial further demonstrate the agreement between
the parties that appellants were to retain crops in
lieu of interest:
Page 63, lines 19-22:
"A. Mr. Wood did say, 'I didn't have you
any interest.' Mr. Rubey says, 'Inasmuch as
you are farming the ground, well, I didn't figure I should pay any interest.' And Mr. Wood
said that was all right."
Page 15, lines 17-24:
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"Q. Did you have a discussion with regard to interest?"
"A. He didn't want to pay interest. I
thought inasmuch as I was cropping the land
it would be all right."
"Q. Because you would have the use and
he wouldn't be required to pay interest on the
unpaid balance?"
"A. Yes."
"Q. Is that what was said between you?"
"A. Yes."
Page 19, lines 2-4 :
"Q. Did you discuss the interest angle?"
"A. I left the interest out inasmuch as
I was keeping the farm to crop. I thought that
would be all right."
The lower court, in considering the contracts
before it, properly observed that prior to full payment for any portion of the land, crops were to be
retained by appellants, and as to said land, the portion of the purchase price pertaining thereto, could
bear no interest. Subsequent to payment in cash in
full for a portion of the land to be conveyed, and
upon proper notice and subsequent conveyance thereof to respondents, appellants would have received
full payment, in cash, and consequently no interest
could accrue on an amount already paid in full.
POINT VII
THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY CONSOLIDATED CIVIL ACTION NO. 139263 WITH NO.
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124832 AND P R 0 PERL Y DISMISSED NO.
139263.
In Civil Action No. 139263, filed with the lower
court appellants sought a Declaratory Judgment asking the court to determine that the contracts which
are the subject of this action, were void by reason
of alleged breach. Appellants also asked for an injunction against the Rubeys to restrain them from
proceeding with their Order to Show Cause in Civil
Action No. 124832 from which these appeals were
taken. This was but another attempt on the part of
appellants to obtain a review of matters theretofore
already conclusively adjudicated.
If appellants objected to the Order to Show
Cause proceedings in the case at bar, they should
have filed their objections thereto in the instant case.
The legal issues attempted to be raised in the declaratory judgment action No. 139263, if any such issues existed, were barred by res judicata as a result
of the first Supreme Court ruling in this matter (R9833, p. 14). In the Decree of the lower Court (R9833, p. 43) paragraph one states:
"Civil Action 139263 be and the same is
hereby consolidated with Civil Action No.
124832, the above entitled action, and after
such consolidation, the Motion of the plaintiffs herein, defendants in said action, for dismissal thereof, is granted in said action, Civil
No. 139263 and the whole thereof is hereby
dismissed.''
Appellants took no appeal from said Decree
which is therefore not before this Court. Appellants
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may not properly incorporate into this proceeding
an appeal from action of the court in Civil No.
139263, from which no proper appeal was taken,
and the time for which appeal has elapsed.
Appellants in their brief refer to a "statutory
right to amend." Counsel for repondents are aware
of no statutory right to amend a pleading. Perhaps
appellants have in mind Rule 15 (a) Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, which states: "A party may amend
his pleading once as a matter of course at any time
before a responsive pleading is served.... "
It is conceded in Civil No. 139263 that appellants would have had a right, as a matter of course,
to amend their Complaint at any time before a responsive pleading was served by respondents. However, respondents did enter a responsive pleading
in the form of a Motion to Dismiss, which Motion
was granted by the court. This foreclosed any right
appellants may have had to amend their pleadings
under Rule 15 (a).
The matter of granting relief under 15 (a)
rests largely within the sound discretion of the
Court, to which the application is made, and its rulings with respect thereto will not ordinarily be disturbed unless it has been made apparent that the
Court has abused such discretion. Johnson vs. Continental Casualty Co., 78 U. 18, 22; 300 P. 1032
(1931). The purported issues in Civil No. 139263
were the same as issues either already adjudicated or
then pending in the instant case. The two cases pre-
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sent a situation squarely within the scope of Rule
42 (a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure providing for
the consolidation of actions. The lower court, therefore, acted soundly with its discretion in consolidating Civil No. 139269 with No. 124832 and thereafter
dismissing 139269, and no showing is made in appellants' brief that the court abused its discretion
in that regard. Consequently the action of the lower
court must stand.
Furthermore, appellants in that action, to-wit:
No. 139269 for Declaratory Judgment, made no motion for leave to amend so they cannot now be heard
to complain that such a motion was not granted.
Appellants further stated in their brief, "It was
also error for the trial court to assume jurisdiction
of a Motion to Dismiss a new case, as this matter
should have gone before the regular Law and Motion
Court for disposition." This statement is curious in
that a motion signed by counsel for appellants appears in the record (R-9833, p. 366-37) as follows:
" ... 3. That this Court direct a consolidation of the action brought by the above
named defendants and against the plaintiffs,
and being Civil No. 139263 in the above entitled Court, and also the action brought by
the plaintiffs against the defendants and
others, case number unknown, but which case
was filed on October 4, 1962."
How can appellants who themselves moved to
consolidate 139263 and 124832 now complain that
the court granted the motion? Once the motion was
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granted, the Motion to Dismiss filed in 139263 became a part of 124832 and was properly considered
by the court as a part of the instant case. In any
event, no appeal was taken from the order of dismissal.
Also, there is no merit to the claim that a Motion to Consolidate should have gone on the Law and
Motion calendar when the Judge who was most
familiar with the whole rna tter was Judge Anderson,
who took the action complained of.
POINT VIII
THE L 0 WE R COURT PROPERLY DIRECTED THE CLERK OF THE COURT TO
MAKE AND .DELIVER A WARRANTY DEED
TO THE RESPONDENTS SUBSEQUENT TO
APPELLANTS' REFUSAL TO OBEY THE ORDER OF THE COURT TO EXECUTE SUCH
DEED.
The power of the Court is set forth in the provisions of Title 78-7-17, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
which defines the powers of every judicial officer,
including the following:
"(2) To compel obedience to his lawful
orders as provided by law."
The Court is hereby granted inherent power to
enforce its own decrees, including the ordering of
the clerk to perform ministerial acts which the defendant has refused to do when ordered to do so. See
Love vs. Watkins, 40 Cal. 547, 6 A.R. 624 (1871),
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cited in Bancroft, Pleading and Practice, Vol. 7, p.
7380, note 18. In a specific performance action, if a
party refuses to execute a deed, a commissioner may
be appointed to execute it for him. Title 78-7-24,
Utah Code Annotated 1953. When jurisdiction is
by statute conferred on a court or judicial officer,
all means necessary to declare it unto effect are also
given, and in the exercise of jurisdiction. If the
course of the proceeding is not specifically pointed
out, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may
be adopted which may appear most conformable to
the spirit of the statute or rules of procedure.
The judgment on directed verdict entered by
the lower court on the 1st day of December 1960,
ordered the appellants specifically to perform the
contracts according to their terms. Mter this judgment for specific performance was unanimously affirmed by the above Court appellants continued to
repudiate the contracts and refused to perform them
according to the Order of the Court. Following the
Order to Show Cause proceedings, a Decree was entered by the court on the 27th day of November
1962, (R-9833, p. 43-5) wherein appellants were
specifically ordered to execute a Warranty Deed to
that portion of the total premises paid for by respondents with their $15,000.00 payment. In the
event of the failure of appellants to execute and deliver such deed, the court ordered that the clerk of
the court should execute and deliver a deed to respondents. Thereafter, appellants in fact failed and
refused to execute the deed, and upon application
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by respondents to the court, the clerk of the court
was ordered to execute and did in fact execute a
Warranty Deed and deliver the same to respondents.
( R-9823, p. 53.)
Rule 70, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:
"If a judgment directs a party to execute
a conveyance of land or to deliver deeds or
other documents or to perform any other specific act and the party fails to comply within
the time specified, the Court may direct the
act to be done at the cost of the disobedient
party by some other person appointed by the
Court and the act when so done has like effect
as if done by the party. . . ."
It would certainly be futile for the State Legislature to grant authority to the Court to order specific performance of a contract without giving it the
power to enforce its order.
Where a judgment directs a party to execute a
conveyance of land and the party fails, the judge
may appoint someone else to perform the act (See
7 Moore'IJ Fed. Practice, 2504).
In ordering the clerk to perform the mechanical act of executing a deed which appellants had
failed to execute, although specifically ordered to do
so, the court below did no more than exercise its
inherent power to enforce its own Decree.
Appellants in their brief at page 16 state the
general rule to be that a judge is required to exercise
his judicial authority in person without delegation
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to another. In 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Sec.
166, p. 844 is stated:
"Similarly there is no delegation of power
in directing a master in chancery to make a
conveyance in case of non-action of the party
held by the Decree to convey, or to compute the
amount due or determine other matters of
fact."
It was thus not a delegation of power by the
lower court when it ordered the clerk to perform a
ministerial act, i.e. execute a deed upon the failure
and refusal of appellants to obey the court order
to do so.
POINT IX
IT WAS PROPER FOR THE LOWER COURT
TO ORDER THE CLERK OF THE COURT TO
SATISFY A JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS F 0 R ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND COSTS OF SUIT OUT OF THE DEPOSIT THAT HAD BEEN MADE TO THE
CLERK OF THE COURT BY RESPONDENTS.
Appellants make no comment in their brief relating to their Point No. 9. No facts are referred
to and no authorities are cited on that point. Point
9 therefore should be disregarded by the Court. See
Point XI below.
By stipulation dated December 7, 1962, (R9833, p. 46) appellants stipulated that "no objection will be made to the obtaining by plaintiffs by
and through their attorneys of record of the sum
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of $1,764.00 from the clerk of the above entitled
Court pursuant to the said Decree entered November 28, 1962," which was in full force and effect
on the day that said funds were obtained from the
clerk. Therefore, by reason of said Stipulation, appellants' Point No. 9 is not well taken and is improper.
Even if the Stipulation referred to above were
not in the record, the court would nevertheless have
had the power to order the clerk of the court to enforce the judgment of the court for attorneys' fees
and costs in that such order is merely an exercise of
the inherent power of the court to enforce its decrees and judgments (See Point VIII above).
The typewritten contract dated April 18, 1959
states as follows:
" ... In the event either party violates
any terms herein, the offended party shall
have recourse to an attroney (sic), the costs
of which shall be borne by the violating party."
Subsequent to the first appeal, on the 12th day
of September 1962, the court entered an additonal
judgment in favor of respondents and against appellants for attorney's fees in the amount of $500.00
in connection with the first appeal in this matter
arising out of appellants' refusal to perform the contract as ordered by the court. No appeal was taken
from the judgment for attorney's fees, and appellants thereby waived their objection that the court
could not properly award attorney's fees during the
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course of the proceedings and before a final determination of this appeal.
Based on said judgment, the clerk of the court
issued a garnishment against Alvin Keddington,
County Clerk, garnishee, to attach a $15,000.00 fund
held by the Court and deposited by respondents in
Civil Action No. 139046. The garnishment was duly
served and duly executed upon out of the funds held
by the clerk. All of these procedures were clearly
proper and within the powers of the court and clerk
pursuant to law. The awarding of judgment for attorney's fees cannot be said to have deprived appellants of due process of law for they were awarded
more than their day in court on the issue of the
validity and enforceability of the contracts, including provision for attorney's fees. S_uch action by the
court cannot be said to have prejudiced the rights
of mortagees who obtained mortgages from appellants subsequent to the original Decree of the court
ordering specific performance. These mortgages had
no claim to the funds held on deposit by the clerk of
the court, and consequently any dispositon of said
funds by garnishment or cou,rt order could not in
any way affect the rights of said mortgagees.
POINT X
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY AWARDED JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES IN
FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS BASED UPON THE
TESTIMONY OF COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTS.
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The language contained in the typewritten contract quoted above with respect to attorney's fees,
makes no reference to the reasonableness thereof and
the lower court properly determined that the only
evidence to support an award of attorney's fees
which would be required by the court was evidence
of the charge made by respondents' counsel. Testimony was taken under oath before the court from
counsel for respondents as to the amount charged
for attorney's fees, which testimony was uncontroverted.
To disallow attorney's fees because .the word
attorney is misspelled in the typewritten contract is
too ridiculous to deserve comment.
POINT XI
THE APPELLATE COURT SHOULD NOT
GIVE CONSIDERATION TO APPELLANTS'
BRIEF FOR THE REASON THAT IT STATES
ONLY POINTS OF LAW AND MAKES NO REFERENCE TO ANY FACTS IN THE RECORD TO
WHICH SUCH POINTS OF LAW MAY BE RELEVANT.
Throughout appellants' brief, random references to various authorities are made without reference to any facts in the record. By failing to relate
the facts from the record to points of law quoted,
appellants have waived any claim of error on the
part of the lower court. In Felkner vs. Smith, 77
U. 410, 296 P. 776 ( 1931) at p. 48, an action founded
upon a ·negotiable promissory note wherein the de-
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fendant appealed from the judgment of the trial
court in favor of plaintiff for the amount due upon
the note, this Court stated that an assignment of
error was not argued in appellants' brief and therefore it was deemed waived. Similarly, appellants
herein have waived any claim of error they might
have argued, had they done so sufficiently.
Further, in an action to recover from an insurance company when the roof of a house collapsed,
the Court in North British and Mercantile Ins. Co.
vs. Sciandra, 256 Ala. 409, 54 So. 2d 764 (1951)
said that an appellate court may deny consideration
to assignments of error which are not referred to in
the brief, or, while mentioned in the brief, are not
supported by citations of authority or argued sufficiently. Appellants have mentioned various alleged
errors in their brief but have failed to argue their
points sufficently. Appellants' brief herein can be
said to be no more than a statement of points with
random citations of law. None of the matters referred to in appellants' brief are sufficiently argued
or sufficiently related to any facts in the record so
that the above Court can intelligently make an appraisal of any alleged error supposedly committed
by the lower court. For these reasons, appellants'
brief should be disregarded and the action of the
lower court should be affirmed.
POINT XII
APPEAL NO. 10001 SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THE ORDER ENTERED
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SEPTEMBER 26, 1963 FROM WHICH THE APPEAL IS TAKEN IS NOT A FINAL JUDGMENT.
Rule 72 (a) U.R.C.P. states: "An appeal may
be taken to the Supreme Court from all final judgments, in accordance with these rules . . ." (See
Utah Constitution, Art. 8, Sec. 9.)
A judgment, to be final, must dispose of the
case as to all of the parties and finally dispose of the
subject matter of the litigation on the merits of the
case. Shurtz vs. Thorley, 90 U. 381, 384, 61 P. 2d
1262 (1936).
The order entered below on September 26,
1963 (R-10001, p. 166), is erroneous. It states:
"Defendants' Motion to overrule objections to the amendment of the decree comes
regularly before the Court for hearing. The
plaintiffs appearing by R. Wm. Bradford as
counsel. The defendants appearing and being
represented by Wm. J. Cayais as counsel. Said
motion is then argued to the Court by respective counsel and submitted. Whereupon the
Court having considered and being advised
hereby denies said motion.''
In fact it was plaintiffs' motion which was befor the court. (R-10001, p. 165), by which plaintiffs-respondents moved to overrule the Objections
of defendants (R-10001, p. 161) to the Amendment
to Decree (R-10001, p. 155). The order of September
26, 1963, should have stated:
"Plaintiffs' Motion to overrule objections
to the amendment of the decree comes regular-
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ly before the court for hearing, the plaintiff
appearing by R. Wm. Bradford, Jr. as counsel, the defendants appearing and being represented by Wm. J. Cayias as counsel. Said
motion is then argued to the court by respective counsel and submitted. Whereupon the
court having considered and being advised
hereby grants said motion."
That the above statement is correct with respect to the action taken by the court September
26, 1963, is supported by the fact that there appears
nothing in the record correcting or otherwise disturbing the Amendment to Decree, which would have
been corrected or otherwise changed had defendantsappellants' objections thereto been allowed, rather
than overruled.
In any event, action by the court with respect
to Objections to Amendment to Decree or a Motion
to Overrule such objections, is not such a final disposition of the subject matter of the case on the
merits as would constitute an appealable "final judgment." Similarly the denial of a Motion for a New
Trial is not an appealable "final judgment." Price
vs. Western Loan and Savings Co., 35 U. 379, 100 P.
677 (1909); Nunley v. Katz, ________ U. 2d ________ , 388
P. 2d 798 (1964); Haslam v. Paulsen ______ U. 2d ______ ,
389 P. 2d 736 (1964).
Appellants in their brief appear to assume that
they have appealed from the entry of the only appealable final judgment which appears in the record subsequent to the first appeal, i.e. the July 29,
1963 Amendment to Decree. (R-10001, p. 155), but
this they have not done, as will be shown hereinafter.
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It is true that appellants' Notice of Appeal (R-10001,
p. 167) refers to "all orders and decisions rendered
by the above-entitled Court with respect to all proceedings that have been had since the above-entitled
matter was reconsidered after return from the Supreme Court." Also, the Notice further states: "This
appeal is on every decision and order rendered herein as well as the report of the referee which was
adopted after objections by the above entitled
Court."
Such sweeping language is certainly contrary
to the intent of Rule 73 (b) U.R.C.P., which requires
specific designation of the judgment appealed from.
Price vs. Western Loan and Savings Co.; Nunley
vs. Katz, supra. It is submitted that by failing to
specify the July 29, 1963 Amendment to Decree in
their Notice of Appeal appellants have failed to appeal therefrom.
A litigant is not entitled to review, on appeal,
of that from which he has not appealed. In Nunley
vs. Katz, supra, this Court dismissed an appeal on
the grounds that appellants there were not entitled to review of a judgment entered December 3,
1962, where the Notice of Appeal specified a judgment entered January 3, 1963. The Court there
stated: "Respondent is entitled to know specifically
which judgment is being appealed." Appellants there
contended that the reference in the Notice to the
wrong judgment was a clerical error which should
have been corrected by the Court under Rule 60 (a)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

48
U.R.C.P. The Court denied this contention and dis-

missed the appeal.
Appellants in the case at bar have not appealed
from the July 29, 1963, Amendment to Decree, but
only from the September 26, 1963, minute order
which was not a final judgment which this court
may consider on appeal.
In Price vs. Western Loan and Saving'S Co.,
supra, appellant designated in the Notice of Appeal,
not the final judgment entered September 26, 1960,
but an order denying a Motion for New Trial entered December 8, 1960. The court held that appeal
did not lie. Likewise Appeal No. 10001, does not lie,
for similar reasons.
The fact that the time within which appellants
may file a Notice of Appeal under Rule 73 (b)
U.R.C.P. begins to run from the denial of a Motion
for a New Trial under Rule 59, or the overruling of
Objections to findings under Rule 52, does not allow
appellants to specify, in a Notice of Appeal filed
within said time, an order from which no appeal can
be taken, instead of the final judgment. Appellants
in No. 10001 filed their Notice of Appeal (R-10001,
p. 167) within ten days after the Minute Order
of September 26, 1963, (R-10001, p. 166) but having
failed to appeal specifically from the Decree of July
29, 1963, (R-10001, p. 155) their appeal should be
denied for the reasons, and based upon the authority
hereinabove set forth.
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that upon the foregoing presentation of authorities and argument that
the action of the lower Court from which these appeals were taken was proper and that the said action
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
PERRIS S. JENSEN
R. WILLIAM BRADFORD, JR.
Attorneys for Rrupondents
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